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Paul Samuelson's (1952, 1954) classic 
papers on the transfer problem addressed 
two separate analytical issues: the "positive" 
effect of a transfer on the terms of trade; and 
the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor 
and the recipient. 
Since then, a considerable body of litera- 
ture has grown up on the positive analysis. 
While Samuelson (1954) himself had ex- 
tended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to 
allow for tariffs and transport costs, subse- 
quent writers have analyzed other extensions 
of the model: for example, to allow for non- 
traded goods as with leisure in Samuelson 
(1971); or general nontraded goods in John 
Chipman (1974) and Ronald Jones (1970, 
1975). 
Remarkably, however, the welfare analysis 
of transfers has not paralleled these develop- 
ments. Since Wassily Leontief (1936) pro- 
duced an example of immiserizing transfer 
from abroad and Samuelson (1947) argued 
that the example required market instability, 
the proposition that has monopolized atten- 
tion has been that a transfer in the conven- 
tional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version 
cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the 
donor as long as world markets are stable (in 
the Walras sense). Interestingly, Samuelson 
(1954), who did extend the positive analysis 
to include tariffs, did not go on to ask 
whether immiserization of the transfer recip- 
ient (and hence symmetrically enrichment of 
the donor in a two-country model) could 
now arise consistent with market stability. 
Recently, the welfare analysis of transfers 
has been extended in two different direc- 
tions, both apparently unconnected, and both 
yielding the conclusion that transfers from 
abroad can be immiserizing (and that the 
donor may improve its welfare) despite 
market stability. One route to this conclusion 
has been the introduction of a third eco- 
nomic agent (or country) that is outside of 
the transfer process. In the Appendix of his 
1960 paper analyzing the interaction between 
trade policy and income distribution, Harry 
Johnson discussed the possibility of welfare- 
paradoxical redistribution between two fac- 
tor-income classes (capital and labor) in an 
open economy, thereby providing what can 
be interpreted as a treatment of the three- 
agent transfer problem for the case in which 
donor and recipient are both completely spe- 
cialized in the ownership of a single different 
factor.' An independent analysis of the 
three-agent transfer problem, using a restric- 
tive model with given endowments of goods 
and fixed coefficients in consumption, was 
also undertaken in an important paper by 
David Gale (1974).2 Brecher and Bhagwati 
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'After the present paper was submitted for publica- 
tion, and following its presentation at Rochester, our 
attention was drawn to this Appendix, which was no- 
ticed by a student of Ronald Jones. Subsequently, we 
learned from Makoto Yano that Motoshige Itoh had 
pointed out an important related paper by Ryuotaro 
Komiya and T. Shizuki (1967), whose condition (11) for 
the Johnson case anticipated our equation (12) below. 
We are grateful for having both of these references 
brought to our attention. 
2 Gale constructs an example in which the donor is 
enriched along with the recipient. Furthermore, this 
immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis- 
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(1981) also independently pioneered this 
analysis in the context of a three-agent model 
where the recipient country is split into one 
subset of "national" factors and another of 
"foreign" factors, and the conditions for the 
immiserization of the national factors after 
receiving a transfer from abroad are analyzed 
and shown explicitly to be consistent with 
market stability. 
Another route has been to consider 
transfers in the presence of exogenously 
specified domestic distortions. Thus, Brecher 
and Bhagwati (1982) have analyzed the case 
of a transfer in the presence of a production 
distortion in the recipient country and shown 
that the recipient can get immiserized despite 
market stability if the recipient's "overpro- 
duced" good is inferior in the donor's con- 
sumption. Hatta, in an early unpublished 
paper (1973a), has also demonstrated for a 
closed economy with constant-cost produc- 
tion that a transfer between two agents, when 
there is a distortionary wedge between pro- 
ducer and consumer prices, could immiserize 
the recipient consistent with market stability. 
Peter Diamond (1978) has also recently con- 
sidered the welfare impact of transfers when 
a price distortion exists in an economy with 
convex technology, and he gives compara- 
tive-static results that are consistent with 
paradoxes. 
This recent proliferation of paradoxical 
cases of immiserizing transfers (and enrich- 
ing transfer payments) is reminiscent of the 
earlier multiplication of cases involving im- 
miserizing growth, with Bhagwati's (1958) 
analysis of the case of a large country in free 
trade being followed by Harry Johnson's 
(1967) analysis of the case of a small country 
with a tariff.3 The latter proliferation led to 
the generalized theory of immiserizing growth 
(Bhagwati, 1968b) whose major, influential 
proposition is that growth, in the presence of 
a distortion implying departure from full 
optimality, can be immiserizing since the 
primary gain from growth at optimal policies 
may be outweighed by an accentuation of 
the loss from the distortion vis-'a-vis the opti- 
mal policies. 
Can a similar, striking generalization be 
developed in regard to the transfer-induced 
paradoxes? It is the general conclusion of 
our analysis in this paper that, indeed, it can. 
We demonstrate that the phenomenon of 
immiserizing transfers from abroad (and the 
analytically symmetric phenomenon of en- 
riching transfer payments) in the presence of 
market stability can arise only if there is a 
distortion characterizing the economy in 
question. 
This general conclusion is critically depen- 
dent on our demonstration below that the 
three-agent case, which appears prima facie 
to involve no distortion while producing the 
noted paradoxes, is indeed characterized by 
what Bhagwati (1971) has called a foreign 
distortion, since the country is not using an 
optimal tariff. Moreover, the exercise of their 
joint monopoly power by the recipient and 
donor (viewed as members of a customs 
union) vis-a-vis the nonparticipant agent will 
be shown to eliminate the paradoxes in ques- 
tion. 
Thus, in Section I, we develop the basic 
analysis of transfers when there are two eco- 
nomic agents (countries) engaged in the 
transfer process, but there is an added agent 
outside the transfer process so that we have a 
bilateral transfer in a multilateral context. 
Conditions are established for immiseriza- 
tion of the recipient, for enrichment of the 
donor and for the "double perversity" when 
these two paradoxical outcomes arise simul- 
taneously. Economically intuitive explana- 
tions of these results are derived in a number 
of alternative ways. 
erize the (new) recipient. A simple calculation, more- 
over, shows that the Gale example is Walras-stable. 
Gale's work has stimulated a number of papers, most of 
which assume fixed commodity endowments and/or 
fixed consumption coefficients. A notable exception is 
an analysis of the three-agent transfer problem by 
Makoto Yano (1981), who introduces substitutability in 
both production and consumption. (We are grateful to 
Ronald Jones and Peter Neary for drawing our attention 
to Yano's work, after the research for the present paper 
was virtually completed.) A fuller discussion of these 
and related papers, in an evidently growing and im- 
portant literature, is provided by us (1982b) elsewhere. 
3Robert Aumann and B. Peleg (1974) have re- 
discovered, in a restrictive model with no substitution in 
production, the immiserizing growth case of Bhagwati 
(1958). See also Bhagwati (1982). 
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In Section II, yet further intuition on these 
results, in consonance with the theory of 
immiserizing growth, is arrived at, and suit- 
able geometry of the three-agent transfer 
problem is simultaneously developed. Im- 
portantly, the role of inferiority in con- 
sumption or inelastic foreign demand is 
established in making feasible the perverse 
outcomes, which are shown to involve a for- 
eign distortion (correctable by a uniform op- 
timal tariff policy applied jointly by the 
donor and the recipient against the nonpar- 
ticipant). In turn, this establishes an interest- 
ing parallel between the conditions for the 
immiserizing-transfer paradox in the three- 
agent, foreign-distortion case and the condi- 
tions established in Bhagwati's (1958) immis- 
erizing-growth case which also involves a 
similar foreign distortion (i.e., growth for a 
large country that is failing to use an optimal 
tariff because of its free trade policy). 
Section III then presents the implications 
of our results for some important theoretical 
and policy problems in both international 
and closed-economy contexts. 
I. Transfers with Three Agents: 
Model and Analysis 
We begin with a formal analysis of the 
three-agent transfer problem, drawing on du- 
ality theory in terms of compensated de- 
mand functions, which have been introduced 
into the welfare-theoretic analysis of interna- 
tional trade by Hatta (1973b, 1977), Hatta 
and Takashi Fukushima (1979), and most 
notably and comprehensively by Avinash 
Dixit and V. Norman (1980), although earlier 
applications such as indirect utility functions 
are to be found also in the work of Chipman 
(1972). 
A. The Model 
Consider a world economy consisting of 
three countries: a, /3, and y. (While the anal- 
ysis is couched in terms of three countries, it 
is applicable immediately to a closed-econ- 
omy context with three agents within the 
economy, or to a two-country international 
economy where one country is disaggregated 
into two groups as in Brecher-Bhagwati, 
1981.) Each country produces and consumes 
two goods, X and Y. Free trade and perfect 
competition prevail. 
Now, suppose that country a makes a 
transfer to country y. Country /3 does not 
participate in the transfer process. We will 
call a the donor, y the recipient, and /3 the 
nonparticipant "outside" country. The objec- 
tive of the analysis will be to determine the 
effect of the transfer on the welfare levels of 
the three countries. 
The following notation will be used in 
presenting our model: 
q = the relative price of good X, 
ui= the welfare level of country i, 
T= the value of the transfer in terms 
of good Y, 
e'(q, u')= the expenditure function of coun- 
try i, 
r'(q)= the revenue function of country i, 
xi(q, ui)= the compensated import-demand 
function for good X by country i, 
for i= a,/3,y. 
We then define an overspending function ci 
as follows: 
ci(q, ui) ei(q, ui)- r(q) i = a, /3, y. 
Evidently, the value of this overspending 
function represents the difference between 
the expenditure necessary to achieve the util- 
ity level ui when the goods-price ratio is q 
and the revenue of the producers of country i 
at the same price ratio. Thus, ci is the amount 
of added revenue (i.e., transfer income) that 
is necessary for this country to sustain ui 
when the price ratio is q. 
Using this notation, we can write our 
model as follows: 
(1) ca(q, ua)+ T= O, 
(2) c(q, u) = O, 
(3) cy(q, uy)-T= O, 
(4) xa(q,ua)+xf(q,ufi)+xy(q,uy)=O. 
This model of four equations contains four 
variables: u', uf, uy, and q. Equations (1)-(3) 
are the budget equations for the respective 
countries, while equation (4) is the market 
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equilibrium condition for good X. (In view 
of Walras' Law, the market-clearing equation 
for good Y has been omitted.) 
B. Comparative Statics 
We now examine the impact of an exoge- 
nous increase in T upon the variables of the 
model above. Throughout the paper, sub- 
scripts always indicate partial differentiation 
with respect to a particular variable; for ex- 
ample, c'= dca/dua and x" = dx"/dq. The 
following theorem can now be derived. 
THEOREM 1: Assume (without loss of gener- 
ality) that e' = ep = e '=1 initially; and let 
/\-xaxua + x13x13 + XYXUY- X where Xq q 
+X+Xq-Y Then 
q q* 
(5) dqldT = ( x Yx'a )//,, 
(6) dua/dT= [xq-x(x -x )]/A, 
(7) du,/dT =-[x,(x'Y-x )]- /, 
(8) du-/dT=- [xq -x(x-xu 
PROOF: 
Taking the total differential of (1) through 
(4), applying the assumptions of the theorem, 
and using the well-known property that c'= 
x' (for i = a, /3, y), we obtain 
1 0 0 Xa dua -1 
o 1 0 XA du# 0 
o o 1 x'Y du~ -Y 1 T 
Xa X/ XY Xq dq 0 
Applying Cramer's Rule to this system and 
taking notice of (4), we immediately obtain 
the theorem. 
It is readily shown that A equals (minus) 
the slope of the general equilibrium, excess- 
demand schedule of good X for the world as 
a whole.4 Thus, the Marshall-Lerner condi- 
tion for (Walrasian) stability implies that 
A > 0. 
Note also that equations (5) and (7) yield 
duO/dT > 0 if and only if - x dq/dT > 0. 
Thus, the welfare of the country not involved 
in the transfer improves if and only if the 
price of its export good goes up as a result of 
the transfer-as is indeed immediately evi- 
dent. 
C. Paradoxes: Enrichment of Donor and 
Immiserization of Recipient 
The welfare impacts of a transfer upon the 
donor and the recipient, however, are not as 
simple as this. In the remainder of this sec- 
tion, therefore, we will give various interpre- 
tations of Theorem 1, to shed more light on 
the conditions under which the paradoxes of 
immiserized recipient and enriched donor 
arise. Note immediately, however, that if 
either x = 0 or (xO - x") = 0, that is, if 
either /3's net trade is zero or /3 and y share 
an identical marginal propensity to consume 
X,5 the second term in the numerator of the 
right-hand side of (6) is zero. In this case, 
equation (6) reduces to dua/dT= xq=l\ 
which is, of course, the familiar expression 
for the welfare effect on the donor in the 
two-country analysis. With A > 0 and Xq < 0, 
dua/dT must be negative, that is, the donor 
must be immiserized. When the only trade 
partner of the donor is the recipient, or when 
the recipient and the nonparticipant share an 
identical marginal propensity, therefore, the 
welfare impact on the donor is as if we were 
in a two-country world, and the donor 
paradox never arises. A symmetric conclu- 
sion can be derived for the welfare effect on 
the recipient from equation (8). 
Generally, however, the second term in the 
numerator of the right-hand side of (6) or (8) 
4First use equations (1), (2), and (3) to write uG = 
Pa(q, T), u = v(q) and u" = v7(q, T , respectively. 
Then define xa[q, Pv(q, T)]+ x [q, vIJ(q)]+ 
xI[q, v(q,T)]=x(q,T), which is the world's un- 
compensated excess-demand function for good X. Now, 
we have x =xa + xava + x + x' v + xY + x"Yv"= i1 q u q q uq q u q 
-X X- x x-x x"t + X -A. 
5As may be readily verified, the marginal propensity 
to consume good X in country i equals qxl/e' for 
i = a, /3, y. Therefore, if ,B and y share an identical 
marginal propensity to consume X, this implies that 
Xa = x'y (recalling the normalization that e' = e- = e' 
= 1). 
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can cause paradoxical welfare effects, and we 
have the following necessary conditions for 
the paradoxes: 
(9) duT > 0 implies that x (x' - x ) < 0, 
(10) dU < 0 implies that xp(xp - xU) < 0. 
In fact, (6) and (8) make it clear that when 
Xq = 0 (i.e., when substitution effects are as- 
sumed away), the second inequalities in (9) 
and (10) are not merely necessary but also 
sufficient conditions for the paradoxes. And 
it is equally clear that if Xq is sufficiently 
negative (i.e., if X and Y are readily substi- 
tutable in production and consumption), the 
paradoxes are unlikely to occur.6 
D. Decomposition of Welfare Changes 
In further understanding our results in 
Theorem 1, note first that the right-hand 
sides of (6)-(8) contain the x' terms for all 
countries i (= a, /3, y), except for the one 
whose welfare is stated by the equation in 
question. Let us now examine why this curi- 
ous fact holds; it leads us into an insightful 
way of looking at our results.7 
For this purpose we may conceptually 
decompose the transfer from a to y into two 
stages. At the first stage, a gives transfers to 
both /3 and y in proportion to their initial 
import demand for X. At the second stage, /3 
gives y what it received from a in the first 
stage, with the final situation ending up 
therefore as equivalent to the actual transfer 
going exclusively from a to y. The welfare 
effect on the donor a can then be decom- 
posed into two effects corresponding to these 
two stages. 
Rewriting (6), we have9 
(11) du/dT=xq/A 
x (X +XY)(Xf X-) 
(x+x7) A 
Now it is possible to show that the first stage 
leads to the first term on the right-hand side 
of (1 1).Io Making transfers to every other 
country in the world economy in proportion 
to its initial import demand for X is there- 
fore tantamount to making a transfer to the 
other country in a two-country context! This 
process therefore results in a negatively 
signed term; the paradox of donor enrich- 
ment cannot come from this stage. 
On the other hand, the second stage leads 
to the second term on the right-hand side of 
(11).11 The sign of this term depends exclu- 
6This might explain why Gale (1974), who tried to 
construct an example of donor enrichment, wound up 
assuming fixed coefficients in consumption (with fixed 
coefficients in production also implied by his exchange 
model), and confessed his inability to admit "smooth 
preferences." Interestingly, the absence of smooth pref- 
erences also characterizes the examples that Gale attri- 
butes to other major mathematical economists such as 
Dreze and McFadden. Just recently, Daniel Leonard 
and Richard Manning (1982) provided a paradoxical 
example involving smooth preferences within an ex- 
change model. 
7In Section II and in fn. 15 below, we spell out an 
alternative way of seeing why the income terms of only 
the two "other" countries appear in equations (6) and 
(8). 
8That is, when a gives out a transfer of one unit of Y, 
,B receives x/(x + xy) units of Y and y receives 
x Y/(x + xy) units of Y. If these ratios are positive, 
both countries receive positive amounts of transfer. If 
x/(x + xY) is negative, ,B receives a negative transfer, 
viz, it gives a transfer of -x0/(x + xy) to a. In this 
situation, y receives one plus - x/(x + xy) units of 
Y, since xy/(x + xy) = I - x/(x + xy). Similarly, y 
gives a positive transfer to a when xy/(x + x ) is 
negative. 
9The reader can similarly rewrite (8) for the welfare 
effect on the recipient, y. 
'0To see this, appropriately exploit the essence of the 
result in (6). A unit transfer from a to ,B implies 
(a) dua/dTaf3, = I X0)] /A 
and from a to y implies 
(b) dua/dTaY [Xq- ( x x )] /. 
With actual transfers in the first stage divided according 
to the ratios x/(x + xy) and xy/(x + xy) between B 
and y, these ratios should be multiplied into (a) and (b), 
respectively. Adding the resulting equations yields xq/A. 
IIThis readily follows from appropriately using the 
essence of the result in (7) and the fact that x /(x' + x- ) 
represents the share of the transfer f.] received at the first 
stage and hands out to y in the second stage. Equation 
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sively on the direction of the price change 
caused by the second-stage transfer. We al- 
ready know from (9) that xp(xp - xY) < O is 
a necessary condition for the paradox of 
donor enrichment, and why this occurs is 
readily seen from (11) and the second-stage 
argumentation. 
E. Alternative Necessary Conditions 
for Paradoxes 
We now turn to an alternative, equally 
insightful way of looking at Theorem 1. We 
first establish a set of necessary conditions 
for the paradoxes of donor enrichment and 
recipient immiserization. Then, it will be 
shown how these conditions are also neces- 
sary for price amplification effects which 
further help to explain the paradoxical possi- 
bilities. 
Take again the case of donor welfare, and 
apply the Slutsky equation to (6) to get12 
(12) du = xe + Xqy + x~ + xpx7) dua q q q~x~~ f  
(12) d 
where x(q) is the uncompensated import- 
demand function for country ,8. Now, given 
A > 0, and assuming throughout the rest of 
this section without loss of generality that 
x < 0 (i.e., country /3 exports good X), we 
see immediately that the donor can be en- 
riched only if either xy < 0, or x > O, or 
both. That is, if a transfer enriches donor a, 
then either X is an inferior good to the 
recipient y or the offer curve of the nonpar- 
ticipant outside country /3 is inelastic (such 
that the export supply of X by /3 falls as the 
relative price of X rises). 
Similarly, for the immiserization of the 
recipient, we must have du'/dT < 0, and this 
can be shown to imply that either x' < 0 or 
x > 0 or both. 
To understand more fully why these con- 
ditions are necessary for the paradox of (say) 
donor enrichment, the Slutsky equation and 
(4) may be used straightforwardly to rewrite 
the stability condition as A = xa(Xa - Y)_ 
xa- x -(x + xqxe) > O. If (x + xYx) > 
0-which can happen only if either x > 0 or 
xY < 0 (given still that x < 0)- A will be 
smaller than in the two-country case (in 
which x = x = 0), ceteris paribus. There- 
fore, the price change measured by equation 
(5) is amplified by the presence of the third 
(nonparticipant) country /3. If this price- 
amplification effect applies to an improve- 
ment in the terms of trade for a, the donor 
may be paradoxically enriched by the trans- 
fer, even though the (smaller) terms-of-trade 
improvement in the two-country case cannot 
be great enough for the paradox of donor 
enrichment. By similar reasoning,'3 if P3's 
offer curve is inelastic or good X is inferior 
for a, an amplified deterioration in y's terms 
of trade may be great enough for the para- 
dox of recipient immiserization. 
These necessary conditions for an interna- 
tional transfer paradox are, interestingly, 
analogous to those established by Bhagwati 
(1958) for immiserization due to domestic 
growth (in the form of factor-endowment 
expansion or technological improvement). As 
he showed, the paradoxical possibility of im- 
miserizing growth requires that either growth 
be ultra-biased against production of the im- 
portable (i.e., the importable be an "inferior" 
good in production) or the foreign offer curve 
be inelastic. This analogy suggests im- 
mediately that, if immiserizing growth para- 
doxes are attributable to the presence of 
distortions, as shown in Bhagwati (1968b), it 
should be possible to interpret the present 
transfer analysis in the three-agent context 
also as one where the paradoxes of immis- 
erized recipient and enriched donor arise only 
when a distortion is present. The distortion 
(7) applies since, when f.] makes a transfer to y, the 
welfare effect on a is as if a is the nonparticipant, 
outside country; the resulting welfare impact on a per 
unit transfer from ,B to y is 
duG _Xa( x"- x ) (Ax + xY ) ( x-x" X) 
dTt~ A A 
'2Substituting xi,= A- x(x into (6) and recalling 
xq =x+ xq + xq yields (12). 
'3In this case, the Slutsky equation and (4) should be 
used to rewrite the stability condition as 
A = XY(X"t- Xc)- X- xY-X- - AX > ? x"(XU u q q q q u 
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here, as in Bhagwati (1958), must again arise 
as a foreign distortion in the sense of Bhag- 
wati (1971); that is, the failure to exploit 
monopoly power in trade. Indeed, this can 
be demonstrated, as in Section II below. 
II. Viewing Three-Agent Paradoxes as 
Resulting from Foreign Distortion 
We now proceed to demonstrate that the 
perverse welfare responses to bilateral trans- 
fers in the multilateral framework of three 
agents are attributable to the presence of a 
foreign distortion, and that the introduction 
of a suitable optimal tariff that eliminates 
this distortion will rule out the paradoxes. 
We first demonstrate this geometrically, using 
a technique that is suitable for "large" (as 
well as "small") transfers. 
A. The Geometry of the Free Trade Case 
We begin by illustrating in Figure 1 the 
possibility of a perverse welfare response to 
bilateral transfer in the three-agent case. For 
convenience of exposition without loss of 
generality, the diagram treats countries a 
and y as partners of a customs union en- 
gaged in (free) trade with country /8. (This 
treatment takes on more than expositional 
importance in Part B below, when a and y 
uniformly impose an optimal tariff policy 
against 8.) In the initial pretransfer equi- 
librium, the union produces on its produc- 
tion-possibility frontier QYQ, at point Q, 
consumes on its Scitovsky (1942) frontier 
Syx at point S, and trades with country 48 
from point Q to point S along the price line 
QS.14 To avoid cluttering the diagram, we 
have not drawn country 46's offer curve, 
which starts at point Q and passes through 
point S. For the sake of concreteness only, 
let country 48 be again an exporter of com- 
modity X (i.e., x < 0) while country a im- 
ports this good (with xa > 0). 
Now, with country a making a transfer to 









0 ox Good X 
FIGURE 1 
trade consequently improve because the 
marginal propensity to consume good X is 
greater for country a than for its union 
partner. Figure 1 illustrates the borderline 
case in which the terms-of-trade improve- 
ment is exactly enough to leave country a's 
welfare unchanged, despite the transfer. The 
union shifts in production to point Q' on 
curve QyQx, and moves in consumption 
to point S' on curve SS', which is another 
Scitovsky frontier in the map corresponding 
to a constant level of country a's welfare. 
Country 83's offer curve (still not drawn) 
now starts at point Q' and passes through 
point S'. 
In Figure 1 as drawn, good X is clearly 
inferior for the union as a whole. This inferi- 
ority, moreover, must characterize country y 
in particular, since country a's welfare is 
constant throughout the entire Scitovsky 
map. By contrast, no such inferiority would 
be implied if curve S'S' were redrawn to 
touch line Q'S' at point S" (lying east of 
point S), while country 83's offer curve (not 
shown) were redrawn to pass through point 
S" when starting at point Q'. In this alterna- 
tive case, however, the offer curve of country 
,8 must be inelastic, because a deterioration 
in this country's terms of trade is now associ- 
ated with a rise in exports to the union. 
(These two alternative conditions are, of 
course, those already established in Section I, 
'4For further details on the use of production-possi- 
bility and Scitovsky frontiers corresponding to a pair of 
countries involved directly in a bilateral transfer, see 
Brecher and Bhagwati (1982). 
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Part E, above for the paradox of donor en- 
richment.) 
By similar reasoning, an actual rise in 
country a's welfare, in response to a transfer 
to country y, might occur provided that either 
good X is inferior in the latter country or the 
offer curve of country /8 is inelastic. This 
paradoxical possibility would occur in Figure 
1 if country 83's offer curve (not drawn) were 
respecified to cross line Q'S' southeast of the 
consumption point S' (or alternatively S") 
after starting at the production point Q'. In 
this case, after the transfer, there would re- 
main a world excess supply of good X if q 
fell only enough to leave ua constant at the 
initial (pretransfer) level. Thus, given stabil- 
ity, country a's terms of trade would ulti- 
mately have to improve still further, thereby 
leading to the paradox of donor enrichment."5 
Essentially the same argument shows that 
country y might incur a welfare loss from 
receiving the transfer, provided that either 
good X is inferior in country a, or (as before) 
the offer curve of country /8 is inelastic. If 
the required conditions for a perverse re- 
sponse in welfare hold simultaneously for 
both partners of the union, the transfer from 
country a to country y could raise the 
former's welfare and lower the latter's, im- 
plying a double perversity of outcomes. 
B. Optimal Tariff Against a 
Nonparticipant Country 
Consider now the following alternative 
ways of demonstrating how the use of an 
optimal tariff by the union rules out the 
paradoxes at issue. 
1. A Geometric Analysis. Consider the exten- 
sion of the preceding analysis to the case 
where the union of a and y always maintains 
a uniform, optimal tariff vis-'a-vis /3, the 
nonparticipant country. Thus, for each value 
of the domestic goods-price ratio in Figure 2, 
the union adjusts the tariff to set the world- 
price ratio at the level consistent with the 
Robert Baldwin (1948) envelope BE, given 
the union's production-possibility frontier 
QyQx and the offer curve QG of country /8. 
To avoid cluttering the diagram, we have 
drawn this offer curve with its origin in only 
one of the many possible positions. Alterna- 
tively, if this origin were placed at point Q' 
(instead of Q) for example, the offer curve 
would touch curve BE at point S' (rather 
than S). Following a common convention, 
tariff revenues collected by each union mem- 
ber are returned to its consumers in lump 
sum fashion. 
This optimal-tariff policy must result in 
the union consuming along its Baldwin 
envelope BE of Figure 2 in equilibrium. Ini- 
tially, the union produces on its production- 
possibility frontier QYQ, at point Q, 
consumes on its Scitovsky frontier S Sx at 
point S, trades with country /8 along the 
external-price line QS from point Q to point 
S, and imposes a tariff to create the propor- 
tional wedge between this price line and the 
(parallel) domestic-price lines (not drawn) 
tangent to curve QyQx at point Q and to 
curve SySx at point S. 
151n determining whether there remains a world ex- 
cess supply of good X when q is adjusted to keep ua 
constant after the transfer, clearly the substitution effect 
but not the income effect plays a role in (the 
unchanged-welfare) country a, whereas both of these 
effects are relevant in countries fi (as up varies with q) 
and y (as uy varies between Scitovsky frontiers). Thus, 
we have additional insight into why the income effects 
xI and x'y but not x' enter the necessary condition (9). 
Similar reasoning sheds extra light on (10). 
Two further remarks are in order. First, the use of 
the Scitovsky technique to analyze welfare changes here 
is only a natural counterpart to the two-stage derivation 
technique used by trade theorists in positive analyses. 
Thus, if the impact of a parametric change on the terms 
of trade is analyzed, one can hold the terms of trade 
constant, compute excess demand for one of the two 
goods, and then use the stability condition to determine 
the direction of the terms-of-trade change, a procedure 
introduced by Johnson, Mundell, and many other trade 
theorists in the 1950's. Identically, if one is interested 
instead in welfare change (of say the donor), one can 
equally hold welfare (of the donor) constant, compute 
excess demand, use the stability condition to determine 
the terms-of-trade change and then immediately the 
welfare change. This was, in fact, the procedure utilized 
in the analysis of immiserizing growth in Bhagwati 
(1958); and for the transfer problem, it leads naturally 
to the resurrection of the Scitovsky curves, as in the text 
above. Second, the use of Scitovsky curves in analyzing 
the transfer paradoxes was introduced earlier in Brecher 
and Bhagwati (1982). Whereas our Scitovsky technique 
easily handles large changes, the use of the two-stage 
holding-welfare-constant technique for small changes 
has also been introduced in Yano (1981) who credits 
Ronald Jones for the idea. 
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FIGuRE 2 
Now let the transfer take place from coun- 
try a to country y, and imagine what would 
hypothetically happen if the domestic rela- 
tive price of good X within the union fell 
exactly enough to leave the donor country 
a 's welfare constant, despite the transfer. 
Under these circumstances, the union would 
move to point Q' in production, trade along 
the external-price line Q'S" with the rest of 
the world, and plan to consume at point S" 
on the Scitovsky frontier S"S" drawn for the 
initial level of country a's welfare. (For 
well-known reasons, the slope of curve S"SX" 
at point S" equals the union's internal prod- 
uct-price ratio, given by the common slope 
of curves QyQx and BE at points Q' and S', 
respectively.) In this way, an excess demand 
(represented by the length S'S") for good X 
for the world as a whole would necessarily 
emerge,'6 and the relative price of this good 
would have to rise to clear world markets 
under stable conditions. 
This implies that country a, the donor, 
cannot enjoy enrichment since the initial fall 
in the price of X which exactly offset the 
primary loss from the transfer would now be 
reduced, leaving a worse off. Similarly, we 
could establish that the recipient, y, cannot 
be immiserized. 
It follows, therefore, that the paradoxes of 
donor enrichment and recipient immiseri- 
zation cannot arise if the union of the donor 
and the recipient follows the policy of adopt- 
ing an optimal tariff that equates their 
domestic rates of (producer) transformation 
and (consumer) substitution to the foreign 
rate of transformation, such that DRSG = 
DRST = DRTG = DRTT = FRT. Under free 
trade, however, the paradoxes become possi- 
ble since the situation suffers from a foreign 
distortion such that DRSG = DRST = DRTa 
= DRTT * FRT. 
2. Algebraic Analysis: The preceding geomet- 
ric analysis immediately suggests an ap- 
proach to a formal proof of the proposition 
that the union of a and y, utilizing an opti- 
mal tariff against /3, would not admit of the 
paradoxes in question. Thus we should be 
able to show that, if such a tariff were in 
place, the paradoxes would be ruled out. 
This can indeed be done as follows. 
Utilizing the model so far, we now dis- 
tinguish between q as the domestic relative 
price of X and p as the external price. Then, 
we write the foreign offer-curve function as 
xZ8(p). Now, define the function p by 
(13) p(q, p) (q - p)[- (p)]. 
If q and p take on their equilibrium values, 
then p(q, p) gives the tariff revenue of the 
union of a and y. Also, let p*(q) represent 
the value of p that maximizes p ( q, p), given 
q, and define the function p* by 
(14) p*(q)- p[q, p*(q)]. 
Now, if the international market is in equi- 
librium with p = p*(q), so that p(q, p) takes 
on its maximized value p*(q) for the prevail- 
ing q, then it can be readily observed that the 
union must be operating on its Baldwin en- 
velope at the point where FRT equals that q. 
In this case, therefore, q - p*(q) is equal to 
the union's optimal tariff rate. Of course, 
there is no a priori guarantee that any arbi- 
trary q and the correspondingp*(q) are equi- 
librium values; in general, they are not. But 
'6Note that point S" in consumption must lie outside 
the curve BE, assuming that good Y is not sufficiently 
inferior to violate the Vanek (1965)-Bhagwati (1968a)- 
Kemp (1968) condition (discussed in more detail by us 
elsewhere, 1982a) for stability in the presence of tariffs. 
See also fn. 17 below. 
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the observation above implies that if the 
union always sets the tariff rate equal to 
q - p*(q) for the prevailing q, then this rate 
coincides with the optimal tariff rate when 
equilibrium is reached. The following result 
can now be established. 
LEMMA 1: If p = p*(q), then (q-p )x = 
PROOF: 
Recalling that the optimal tariff maximizes 
p given q, we have ap[q, p*(q)]/ap = 0, from 
which the lemma follows immediately. 
Now, reformulate the model of this paper 
to allow for the union always imposing the 
tariff rate q - p*(q). Also assume that coun- 
tries a and y collect tariff revenues equal to 
[q - p*(q)]xa(q, ua) and [q - p*(q)] 
xT(q, uT), respectively. (Thus, we implicitly 
assume that both union members import 
good X from country /3, although the results 
of the analysis would be essentially unaf- 
fected if one member received all of the tariff 
revenues because the partner imported noth- 
ing from 8.) The overspending functions ca 
and c- are now given by 
(15) ca(q,ua)=ea(q,ua)-ra(q) 
[q - p*(q)]xa(q, u a), 
(16) c_I(q, u_I)=e_(q, u-)-r-I(q) 
- [q - p*(q)]xY(q, 0). 
Then, our full revised model is given by 
(17) ca0(q,ua)+T=o, 
(18) c0(q, u-)-T= 0, 
(19) xc (q, uc' )+x9 [ p*(q)] 
+ x'Y(q, u'y) = 0. 
This three-equation model has three vari- 
ables: ua, uT and q. 
The following theorem can be derived. 
THEOREM 2: If (17)-(19) hold and (by 
normalization) initially e' =- e-t= 1, then 
(20) dq/dT = (x-I -x )1Ncuc-I 
(21) dua/dT = xt/NScuac-, 
(22) duT/dT= -x tcuac 
- 
where t-xt + ( c'xulc) + (c 'yxuy/c'y) and 
t = X + 3 qu* + XY 
PROOF: 
Taking the total differential of (17)-(19), 
we get 
[cu 0 Cq 1 dua -1 
0 c'Y c'Y duY = 1 dT. 
Xua X-t xq dq 0 
We thus obtain 
da [c-txt-(ca + Cq7)X-t] 
dT scacf 
From (15) and (16), we get 
c+ q q P (x+x)( (q + q) 
and cu = 1- (q-p*)xu. 
Thus, we have 
(24) [c xt -(Ca ?c-Y)xJY (2)[ cuY q ( q + q u 
= [-(q-p*)xuy(x' + 9pq* + x'y)] 
-[ p*(xc + xy)- (q -p*)(x' + xq7)] xuY 
=- x [(q- p*)8- x] =xt 
where the last expression follows from 
Lemma 1 and equation (19). Substituting 
(24) into (23) immediately yields (21). The 
other equations in Theorem 2 are derived 
similarly. 
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It is evident then from (21) and (22) that, 
with ,'c-c1 > O owing to market stability,'7 
and with xt < 018 we necessarily get dua/dT 
< 0 and du/dT >O. That is, the donor must 
be immiserized and the recipient must be 
enriched. Paradoxes cannot arise. 
3. A General Proposition. Now that we have 
demonstrated that the pursuit of an optimal 
tariff policy by the (union of the) donor and 
recipient jointly vis-'a-vis the nonparticipant 
agent will rule out transfer paradoxes, in a 
Walras-stable context, we are able to see that 
the presence of a suitably interpreted (foreign) 
distortion is required in the three-agent case 
if the paradoxes are to arise.'9 At the same 
time, for the case of two agents, we know 
that exogenously imposed price distortions 
(for example, tax-cum-subsidies on produc- 
tion, consumption or trade) can also gener- 
ate the transfer paradoxes (in the presence of 
inferior goods), as established by Brecher 
and Bhagwati (1982) and ourselves (1982a). 
We also know from the former paper, which 
analyzes transfer-induced distortions in the 
context of additionality requirements, and 
from the latter paper which analyses trans- 
fer-seeking DUP activities by domestic and 
foreign lobbyists, that endogenous (i.e., trans- 
fer-induced) distortions can also generate 
transfer paradoxes, consistent with Walras- 
ian stability. We can therefore now state the 
following general proposition: 
PROPOSITION: The paradoxes of enriched 
donor and immiserized recipient cannot arise 
unless a distortion is present in the system. 
III. Conclusion: Implications for Analytical 
and Policy Problems 
The foregoing analysis has important im- 
plications in a number of areas of theoretical 
and policy concern. 
International: (i) Our analysis of the 
three-agent problem does modify the earlier 
theoretical presumption against the possibil- 
ity of stability-compatible paradoxes. (ii) 
Since, in the international context, repara- 
tions and aid are never given by one country 
to the "rest of the world," but are always 
bilateral transactions in a multilateral con- 
text, policymakers should be alert to the 
possibility that their intentions may be 
frustrated by paradoxical outcomes. (iii) As 
noted by Brecher and Bhagwati (1981), the 
three-agent transfer problem has an im- 
mediate counterpart in the analysis of cus- 
toms unions with full mobility of factors 
within the union. Thus, for instance, it is 
possible for Italy to be immiserized within 
the EEC by receiving an aid inflow from the 
non-EEC world, under conditions estab- 
lished by us, consistent with market stability. 
Domestic: (i) Internal redistribution 
from the rich to the poor may also be coun- 
terproductive under the conditions estab- 
lished here. Thus, if the poor receive the 
transfer from the rich while the not-so-poor 
outside group is a net exporter of food and 
the rich also have a lower marginal pro- 
pensity to consume food than the not-so- 
poor, then we know that the conditions are 
satisfied to make it possible for the poor to 
be immiserized by receipt of the transfer. (ii) 
The three-agent analysis also brings into 
sharp focus problems raised by the "basic 
needs" prescription that the targeted poor be 
given purchasing power to buy their nourish- 
ment et al. If this purchasing power is taken 
from the rich, the nonparticipant not-so-poor 
may well find that their real income is di- 
minished by a transfer-induced deterioration 
in their terms of trade (under an appropriate 
ranking of marginal propensities to con- 
sume), so that the poor become not-so-poor 
'7By reasoning similar to that of fn. 4 above, A'= Xq 
where i'(q, T) xa[q, v'(q, T)] + x#[p*(q)] + 
xY[q, vY(q,T)], while the indirect utility functions v'a 
and v now come respectively from equations (17) and 
(18). Thus, Walrasian stability requires that 0 < A'. Also, 
as explained by us elsewhere (1982a), c' and c" must 
both be positive to satisfy the Vanek-Bhagwati-Kemp 
condition assumed in fn. 16 above. 
18As we move along the Baldwin envelope, pq > 0 
and x < 0 are well-known properties of economic ef- 
ficiency. Thus, x" + xOpq + x" < 0. 
19While our analysis can be viewed therefore as 
essentially providing a conceptual way of integrating the 
many-agent problem into the theory of distortions and 
welfare, our result on optimal tariffs also has direct 
policy relevance. For example, if there are two income 
classes, rich and poor, in an open economy with mo- 
nopoly power in trade, we can definitely assert now that, 
if an optimal tariff is always in place, redistribution 
from the rich to the poor will not lead to paradoxical 
results. 
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whereas the not-so-poor are reduced to the 
ranks of the poor! Indeed, our three-agent 
analysis similarly implies a certain caution in 
treating famine relief through transfers of 
purchasing power to the distressed income 
groups. Unless a similar security net is avail- 
able elsewhere, you may then be pushing the 
malnourished not-so-obviously-starving poor 
(who are not receiving this purchasing power) 
below the line so that they are now ravaged 
by the famine. 
The Invisible Shakedown: Our analysis 
also suggests a generalization of the idea 
underlying Gale's (1974) example where both 
the donor and the recipient are enriched by a 
transfer, at the expense of the nonparticipant 
outside agent. What is implied here is a 
seemingly innocuous process that involves 
enrichment at the expense of an unsuspect- 
ing agent. Through this process, the outside 
agent is hurt, for the benefit of the transfer- 
process agents, in a fashion that is by no 
means perceived as such, unlike in overt and 
visible instances such as where an optimal 
tariff may be levied against that agent. 
Gale's example is, however, only one such 
instance: where the transfer is between the 
two agents (a and y) with the third agent 
(,B) remaining outside of the transfer pro- 
cess. But it is easy to see that one of the two 
agents (say a) could equally exploit the third 
agent (,B) by making a direct transfer to it, 
immiserizing it while enriching itself (and 
even, if need be, the other agent, y): the 
conditions for this being readily established 
from equations (6)-(8) above. This is a clear 
case where a gift horse does need to be 
looked at in the mouth since, to mix meta- 
phors ever so slightly, it turns out to be a 
Trojan horse. 
The class of cases where (seemingly in- 
nocuous) transfers can improve the donor's 
welfare at the expense of either the direct 
recipient or an agent outside of the transfer 
process, or both, may then be christened 
generically as phenomena involving an In- 
visible Shakedown. 
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